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A B S T R A C T
This article proposes a fundamental methodological shift in the modelling of policy interventions for
sustainability transitions in order to account for complexity (e.g. self-reinforcing mechanisms, such as
technology lock-ins, arising from multi-agent interactions) and agent heterogeneity (e.g. differences in
consumer and investment behaviour arising from income stratiﬁcation). We ﬁrst characterise the
uncertainty faced by climate policy-makers and its implications for investment decision-makers. We
then identify ﬁve shortcomings in the equilibrium and optimisation-based approaches most frequently
used to inform sustainability policy: (i) their normative, optimisation-based nature, (ii) their unrealistic
reliance on the full-rationality of agents, (iii) their inability to account for mutual inﬂuences among
agents (multi-agent interactions) and capture related self-reinforcing (positive feedback) processes, (iv)
their inability to represent multiple solutions and path-dependency, and (v) their inability to properly
account for agent heterogeneity. The aim of this article is to introduce an alternative modelling approach
based on complexity dynamics and agent heterogeneity, and explore its use in four key areas of
sustainability policy, namely (1) technology adoption and diffusion, (2) macroeconomic impacts of low-
carbon policies, (3) interactions between the socio-economic system and the natural environment, and
(4) the anticipation of policy outcomes. The practical relevance of the proposed methodology is
subsequently discussed by reference to four speciﬁc applications relating to each of the above areas: the
diffusion of transport technology, the impact of low-carbon investment on income and employment, the
management of cascading uncertainties, and the cross-sectoral impact of biofuels policies. In conclusion,
the article calls for a fundamental methodological shift aligning the modelling of the socio-economic
system with that of the climatic system, for a combined and realistic understanding of the impact of
sustainability policies.
ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
1.1. The chilling effect of uncertainty
The starting-point of this article is the need to tackle the
uncertainty facing climate policy-making and the related
investment decision-making through a more realistic modelling
approach.
National and international public policy-making must confront
the unprecedented challenge of effectively managing the complex
interaction of economic development, energy systems and
environmental change (IPCC, 2014). The effects of stringent
climate policies are subject to uncertainty and disagreement,
which hinders policy action, and the lack of policy clarity has, in
turn, a chilling effect on the private sector’s incentives to shift
investment towards sustainable options and opportunities. In
contexts of damaging policy indecision, investors are often
inclined to wait before committing to new long-lived capital
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investment decisions (IEA, 2007). Meanwhile, carbon budgets are
increasingly consumed (IPCC, 2013), and the likelihood of avoiding
dangerous climate change is rapidly decreasing. Consensus on
desired outcomes achieved through international agreements
(COP15 and COP21) urgently needs to be translated into consensus
on actions, to identify effective climate policy, and facilitate its
rapid global adoption.
At the roots of policy indecisiveness lie conﬂicts in our
understanding of the complex interactions between technology,
society, the macroeconomy, and the environment. Policy-makers
often consider that important trade-offs exist between, on the one
hand, improving the sustainability of the economy and, on the
other hand, adequately supporting economic growth. The ensuing
reluctance to act contrasts with the signals from an increasing
body of reports produced by think-tanks and international
organisations arguing that wealth could be generated by new
green technology. Decision-makers thus face dissonant signals,
causing them to hold back their action. Indeed, successful public
(and related private) initiatives of the scale required to stabilise
emissions and adapt to climate change have no precedent, and they
are unlikely to develop unless the important uncertainty as to their
full implications is properly tackled. To make the analysis more
intelligible, we identify four major areas where uncertainty
contributes to climate policy indecisiveness: (1) the dynamics of
technology adoption and diffusion; (2) macroeconomic impacts of
low-carbon policies; (3) interaction between human and environ-
mental systems; and (4) policy implementation and effectiveness.
Solutions to environmental degradation rest on the diffusion of
mostly energy-related innovations, technologies and practices
throughout industries and between households. In many cases,
low-carbon alternatives already exist. However, whether their
adoption can be incentivised in time to avoid dangerous
environmental change, and whether this is economically or
technically possible, are open questions. Similarly, the extent to
which such diffusion could support economic development is not
well understood. Moreover, it is also unclear whether climate
policies may inﬂuence access to food, water and energy, and – if so
– how. Hence, guidance on how to understand the complex
interactions between technology, the macroeconomy, and the
environment is much needed.
This article introduces a methodological approach that could
signiﬁcantly improve our ability to anticipate the effects of climate
policies, by integrating behavioural and non-equilibrium com-
plexity science and environmental feedbacks into climate policy
analysis, with a framework consistent across relevant disciplines.
1.2. Shortcomings of equilibrium and optimisation-based analysis
Equilibrium and optimisation-based approaches (e.g. Cost-
Beneﬁt Analysis or CBA, general equilibrium, cost-optimisation),
despite their contribution to date (e.g. GEA, 2012; Stern, 2007),
have ﬁve main shortcomings for the analysis of the uncertainty
identiﬁed in the preceding section.
The ﬁrst shortcoming concerns the concept underpinning these
approaches, namely that of an effective social planner coordinating
society to minimise total cost or maximise aggregate utility, and
the implicit corollary that there exists a unique stable economic
equilibrium to which the economy tends to return after exogenous
disturbances (e.g. see Mas-Colell et al., 1995). This method leads to
approaches that are generally normative (i.e. they seek to identify
optimal strategies) rather than positive/descriptive (i.e. they do not
always seek to describe actual system behaviour with a high
degree of realism). While a normative approach may appear
attractive for policy purposes, it is fundamentally undermined by
the fact that no such central coordination exists, while the
assumption of optimality neglects critical aspects of economic
reality such as unemployment and market disequilbria that act
both as drivers of change and opportunities for economic growth. If
the economy is assumed to be permanently in an optimal state,
then planning for and incentivising change makes little sense.
A second, closely related shortcoming is that equilibrium
theories do not sufﬁciently allow for the possibility that agents may
not be fully rational. Indeed, equilibrium theories typically involve
ﬁnding the (inter-temporal) maximum of the aggregate utility
function (or, in cost-optimisation models, the minima of total
system costs). Such a maximum (minimum) results from the sum
of the utility (cost) functions of the underlying agents, who are
assumed to carry out an exhaustive ranking of their preferences
over all possible products in all existing markets, and to optimise
their goods basket choices given an economic context (see Mas-
Colell et al., 1995). Underpinning this understanding is the
assumption that the aggregate behaviour of a system of utility-
maximisers can always be expressed as that of a single average
utility-maximising representative agent (see Kirman, 1992, for a
critique). However, if one admits that agents do not carry out an
exhaustive ranking of preferences (bounded rationality) or that
agents may inﬂuence one another, the utility of the representative
agent becomes too complex or impossible to optimise due to
increasing feedbacks and emerging complex dynamics. It then
becomes unclear whether optimisation methods can be used at all,
and whether imposing strictly constant or decreasing returns, in
order for models to converge, does not come at the price of losing
touch with reality. In other words, humans are not supercomputers
optimising their choices over all goods offered in all markets of the
planet (Kirman, 1992). Agents usually know a small subset of
information on goods they desire, and do not desire goods they
know nothing of.
Thirdly, equilibrium theories do not capture the possibility that
agents may inﬂuence one another, leading to positive feedbacks and
increasing returns. In this regard, the conventional equilibrium
perspective may be termed reductionist, in the meaning ascribed to
this term in complexity theory (Anderson, 1972), i.e. the macro
system behaviour is aggregated from micro properties, but without
considering to a full extent the interactions (including mutual
inﬂuence) between agents. Following complexity theory, one may
consider interactions as additional elements that lead to the
emergence of additional collective phenomena. In economics, the
inclusion of multi-agent interactions (speciﬁcally, the possibility
that agents inﬂuence the behaviour of other agents) actually
determines the difference between, on the one hand, models of an
economy effectively formed of a single agent (or N isolated
individuals) and, on the other hand, models of an economy where
additional processes due to crowd effects are allowed to emerge,
including technology transitions and economic cycles. Allowing for
multi-agent interactions is very important in practice because such
interactions are at the roots of all self-reinforcing economic
processes (crowd effects), and these are neglected in equilibrium
economics. In the theory of complex systems, many properties
emerge solely from the interactions between agents, not from the
behaviour of the agents themselves (regardless of whether these
are in homogeneous or heterogeneous contexts). This includes
important economic phenomena such as the proﬁle of diffusion of
innovations, learning-by-doing, expectations in ﬁnance and
economic ﬂuctuations, trends and fashions, technology lock-ins,
and many more. These phenomena exist, but do not stem from
microeconomic behaviour of isolated individual agents. Therefore
they cannot be studied with a methodological understanding that
ignores interactions between agents. With multi-agent interac-
tions, the representative agent may be understood to gain
additional emergent collective behavioural traits that the underlying
agents do not possess when isolated. Thus while there is a good
rationale for desiring a macro theory built on micro-foundations,
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the latter must include not just agent properties (e.g. preferences
and income) but also inter-agent interactions, and this is a great 
yet unavoidable  challenge.
Because optimisation approaches (optimal growth, computable
general equilibrium (CGE), partial equilibrium cost-optimisation)
are sensitive to the curvature of their demand and supply or cost
functions, as such, they are unﬁt to fully account for increasing
returns, understood as self-reinforcing phenomena. This includes
for example a decline in prices resulting from cumulative
investment (learning), leading to investments that increase the
likelihood of more similar investments. In an optimisation context,
such positive feedbacks lead to numerical instability of the model
solver (due to multiple solutions). Yet, processes with increasing
returns are a very important feature of the real world, particularly
as regards climate policy. For example, early investments in solar
energy may ultimately lead the technology, through learning, to
competitiveness and possible market dominance, while a lack of
early investments would have conﬁned the technology to niche
applications.
A fourth, related shortcoming is the inability of conventional
models to account for multiple solutions and path-dependence.
Indeed, when increasing returns are introduced, several solutions
to the optimisation problem emerge, and it becomes unclear which
optimum is the correct one. In the investment example above, two
different possible future solutions evolve from different early
investment decisions. Real-world technological and economic
change is thus path-dependent. Technology adoption typically
follows S-shaped patterns, which stem partly from social inﬂuence
and interactions, where adoption of innovations increases the
likelihood of further adoption of the same innovations (Rogers,
2010). Full path-dependency is a key property missing in many
current economic models and Integrated Assessment Models
(IAMs), the latter combining global energy-economy-climate
change phenomena used to assess environmental policy, whether
they are based on small (e.g. DICE model, Nordhaus, 2013; FUND
model, Anthoff and Tol, 2014; PAGE model, Hope, 2011) or large
datasets (e.g. PRIMES and GEM-E3 models, E3MLab, 2013, 2015;
TIAM model, IEA/ETSAP, 2012; MESSAGE model, IIASA, 2013; AIM
model, NIES, 2012; REMIND model, PIK, 2011).
Finally, equilibrium theories do not sufﬁciently account for
agent heterogeneity. People and ﬁrms are represented by the
behaviour of a single representative agent with rational expectations.
This agent is understood as the aggregate collective behaviour
emerging from the actions of the underlying agents, which can
have distributed preferences (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). But no clear
role is ascribed to differences in the distribution of income or other
socio-economic and industry parameters, and, following expected
utility theory (EUT), only one type of behavioural response exists,
namely a decision based on the expected utility associated with
different choices times their respective probabilities (assumed to
be known). In the real world, at least two types of deviations from
EUT typically arise: behavioural diversity (variations around a
central value, e.g. discrete choice theory, Domencich and
McFadden, 1975) and behavioural biases (systematic deviation
from EUT, e.g. prospect theory, Kahneman and Tverski, 1979; see
also Sorrell et al., 2011 for a review and taxonomy). Agent
heterogeneity can also be interpreted, in a utility maximisation
perspective, as some degree of ambiguity in terms of agent
perceptions of optimality. Agent heterogeneity is important in the
representation of consumer or investor choices, which is critical in
the process of the diffusion of innovations, technologies and
practices (Knobloch and Mercure, 2016). As can be inferred from
standard innovation diffusion theory (Rogers, 2010), behavioural
response, its diversity, the diversity of social groups, and unequal
distribution of information, are precisely what determines actual
rates of adoption of innovations. This is standard knowledge in the
ﬁeld of marketing research (e.g. Smith, 1956 on product
differentiation), where ﬁrms seek proﬁts out of matching products
to diverse consumer proﬁles. In addition, utility maximisation
under budget constraint is known to be an incorrect representation
of attitudes towards risk, gains, losses and uncertainty (as shown in
prospect theory, Kahneman and Tverski, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974).
The shortcomings of equilibrium models in accounting for
multi-agent interactions and their self-reinforcing processes
(complexity) or for diversity (agent heterogeneity) leads to the
exclusion of very important features of reality from the analysis.
Indeed, assuming that a simple unique equilibrium solution exists
to the CBA of climate change mitigation comes at a price. It neglects
both the path-dependency produced by self-reinforcing phenom-
ena (which are at the roots of technology lock-ins, ﬁnancial bubbles
and crises, technology transitions, etc.) and the diversity of agents
(which determines the rates of adoption of innovations). Such
analytical omissions are reﬂected in the types of policies that are
advocated on that basis. Speciﬁcally, they lead to the expectation
that a simple internalisation of environmental costs, in the form of
a pricing instrument (e.g. a carbon price or tax) will optimally and
effectively incentivise technology adoption and diffusion. And,
standard CBA fails to explain why, in the real world, such
instruments do not play out and deliver as expected (Grubb,
2014). In point of fact, the expected optimal success of such
mechanisms is but a reiteration of the initial assumptions of the
model, rather than a result of the actual analysis: efﬁcient markets,
rationality, etc.
Compared to equilibrium models of the economy, complex,
path-dependent models may appear to be less straightforward to
interpret, but should ultimately be easier to relate to reality.
Complexity is routinely handled in climatology simulations, where
it is well understood that small variations between model runs in
their starting values (e.g. pressure, temperature, wind velocity)
lead to large differences in model outcomes (rainfall, cloud cover,
etc) that increase exponentially with simulated time span. This is
due to a high degree of non-linear interaction between variables.
This aspect is very well characterised and expressed as probability
distributions for climate impacts (e.g. in the IPCC, 2013 summary
for policy-makers). Uncertainty increasing with time of projection
will arise in almost any domain where complex interactions
between system components exist, not least in economics. A key
purpose of this article is to argue that economic analysis could
beneﬁt from harmonising its methodology with that of the climate
sciences.
1.3. paradigm shift
Integrating both complexity and behavioural sciences as
applied to economics would bring path-dependency and agent
heterogeneity to the core of the analysis. Complexity science is the
cross-disciplinary ﬁeld that speciﬁcally studies properties that
emerge from interactions between system components, initially
studied in physical, biological and computer sciences (e.g.
Anderson 1972; Sigmund, 1993). By introducing descriptions of
how agents behave and interact, theories and models turn from
normative to positive/descriptive and their methodology evolves
from optimisation to simulation, where the analyst relies on ‘what
if’ approaches.
It is understood that in simulations of complex systems,
uncertainty plays an important role partly because the theories do
not necessarily predict a propensity to return to equilibrium. This is
an aspect well understood and managed in the climate sciences,
and no inherent reason prevents us from using the same concepts
in economics. Indeed, humans behave in unpredictable ways,
partly dictated by diverse contexts. The fact that humans have
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agency or ‘free will’, is a frequent objection raised by social
scientists, to the modelling of behaviour. This argument does not
contradict our approach, however, for the following reason.
Humans do not behave randomly (unlike physical particles);
however, while the actions of individuals cannot be predicted, they
almost always lie within known bounds, over which statistics can
be developed when considering large groups of people (as for
physical particles  e.g. the multinomial logit in social sciences is
conceptually identical to the Boltzmann factor in statistical
physics). The result is a theory of collective behaviour. In complex
systems (e.g. the climate, the economy), both natural and social
systems face the same complexity challenges, and their description
can be modelled in the same way.
In practical terms, the complexity-based methodological
approach proposed in this article follows an analytical structure
where many scenarios are simulated based on possible policy
choices, and acceptable results are retained based on a multidi-
mensional range of outcomes that reach given objectives. For
example, such an approach can involve ﬁltering scenarios, in
multidimensional human and biogeochemical space (e.g. multiple
indicators such as those likely to be selected for the recently
adopted Sustainable Development Goals), to determine ranges of
policy options that enable society to avoid exceeding planetary
boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015) while
ensuring continued human development globally (OXFAM, 2012).
Ambiguity or conﬂicting perceptions of optimal policy-making
between diverse policy-makers or model users is avoided by
leaving subjective outcome value judgments outside of the
scientiﬁc framework. Indeed, unlike conventional multi-criteria
analysis, where optimisation is carried out using subjective
weighting of all factors considered given by the modeller, in the
context we propose one obtains feasible points in a multidimen-
sional outcome space, and the policy-maker can target a possible
subspace in accordance with her/his political platform.
1.4. Why complexity and heterogeneity are so important for
sustainability transitions
A sustainability transition inherently involves socio-technical
change, which is a highly non-linear, self-reinforcing process with
lock-ins that drive expectations, propelled by choices of and
adoption by diverse agents with different perspectives and
incomes (e.g. Geels, 2002; Rogers, 2010). For such a system,
complexity and behavioural sciences provide a suitable analytical
framework. Indeed, technology transitions have an inevitably
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the evolution of the economy through
productivity and structural change, which occurs with the
development of new ﬁrms and industries, and the destruction
of others (e.g. Arthur, 1989; Freeman and Louça, 2001; Perez, 2001;
Schumpeter, 1934, 1939). At the same time, an economic
transformation towards higher or lower sustainability takes place
in direct interaction with the environment and its biogeochemical
cycles. Simultaneous representations of these four domains
(technology, society, the macroeconomy and the environment)
cannot reliably be optimised even on the largest super-computers.
This is so partly because diverse agents will have conﬂicting
deﬁnitions of optimality.
By contrast, in models capable of accounting for agent diversity
and multi-agent interactions, interactions among technology,
society, the macroeconomy and the environment can indeed be
simulated, much like in models used to simulate the climate. Such
models would need to be applied within a framework of
uncertainty analysis, in that they would determine the likely
outcomes (within uncertainty bounds) of different policies or
policy packages as applied to interacting heterogeneous agents.
Such knowledge would provide policy-makers with a much more
realistic platform to make decisions, and a platform that could be
more easily tailored to the speciﬁc features of a given policy
context (e.g. a region, a country, a sector, etc.).
A complexity paradigm has been suggested as a practical
approach to policy problems (Probst and Bassi, 2014). A ﬁeld of
research is also emerging for modelling socio-technical regime
transitions (e.g. Köhler et al., 2009; Holtz, 2011; Holtz et al., 2015;
Mercure, 2015; Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010, 2012, see also
Turnheim et al., 2015), in which ‘core characteristics of transitions’
are itemised as (i) ‘multi-domain interactions’, (ii) ‘path-depen-
dency’, and (iii) ‘drivers and self-reinforcement of change’ (Holtz,
2011). System Dynamics (Sterman, 2000) and agent-based
methods (Tesfatsion, 2002; Buchanan 2009), however, currently
have scalability challenges and thus have not yet been integrated
into IAM scale analysis, or into other forms of global macro models.
It is not necessary  in principle  to model every individual agent
across sectors and its interactions. Equivalent but simpler
statistical models, for instance of technology adoption by
interacting agents, can be readily scaled up (Mercure, 2012;
Mercure et al., 2014; Mercure, 2015), and non-equilibrium models
of the global economy already exist (e.g. Cambridge Econometrics,
2014a; Meyer et al., 2013). At the next level of complexity,
representative cohorts or ensembles can be simulated to obtain
system statistics, while still simulating orders of magnitude fewer
individuals than in the real system. Such approaches are used
successfully in global ecosystem models such as HYBRID (Friend
and White, 2000) and LPJ-GUESS (Smith et al., 2001) as well as in
intergenerational investment and savings modelling (Miles, 1999;
Rangel, 2003; Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 2002).
In this paper, we provide some concrete examples of how
complexity and behavioural sciences can be used for the
assessment of sustainability policies, with emphasis on model
uncertainty analysis, in order to build a powerful approach for
next-generation public policy analysis. We identify four key areas
of climate policy analysis where uncertainty is high and where the
proposed methodological approach would be particularly useful:
dynamics of technology adoption and diffusion (section 2.1);
macroeconomic impacts of low-carbon policies (section 2.2);
interaction between human and environmental systems (section
2.3); and policy implementation and effectiveness (2.4). We then
provide four speciﬁc applications of the proposed methodological
shift in connection with: the diffusion of transport technology
(section 3.1); impact of low-carbon investment on income and
employment (section 3.2); processes with cascading uncertainty
(3.3); and cross-sectoral impacts of biofuels policy (3.4).
2. Four key areas of climate policy where uncertainty is high
2.1. Technology adoption and diffusion
Both complexity and agent heterogeneity are important to
analyse the dynamics of technology adoption and diffusion. The
diversity of consumers and investors inﬂuences the choice of
environmental technology. Consumers’ choice of certain technol-
ogies, such as vehicles, takes place within contexts of distributed
income that span several orders of magnitude (e.g. Mercure and
Lam, 2015). The diversity of incomes, social groups and attitudes is
known to determine the rates and proﬁles of diffusion of
innovations (early and late adopters, etc, see Rogers, 2010). For
present purposes, that means that agent heterogeneity matters in
real life, and it must therefore be integrated into models. Modelling
the impacts of policy incentives to the consumer using averages
over too few consumer group parameters can indeed be
misleading, since differences in income and other socio-economic
parameters across consumers lead to highly diverse consumption
habits.
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Meanwhile, interactions between agents are also crucial to
consider when analysing technology adoption, since technology
generally features increasing returns to adoption: the adoption of
technology by agents is increasingly more probable the more
agents adopt and use the technology. Transitions build upon
themselves with dynamics following a pattern comparable to that
of infectious diseases (see Mansﬁeld, 1961). Thus, increasing
returns may generate resistance to change in socio-technical
regimes (lock-ins), but they may also give momentum to
technological transitions (Anderson et al., 1989, pp. 9–10; Arthur,
2014, 1999). This aspect is treated in detail in the traditions of
evolutionary economics (e.g. Freeman and Perez 1988) and
transitions theory (e.g. Geels, 2002).
For obvious reasons, anticipating how diverse agents may
respond to different policies has elicited great interest (see Grubb,
2014). The impact of incentives to consumers with differing
incomes and social groups has been studied in detail from the
perspective of marketing (empirically, e.g. Bass, 1969; Fisher and
Pry, 1971; McShane, Bradlow, and Berger, 2012), anthropology
(Douglas and Isherwood, 1979) and behavioural economics
(discrete choice modelling, e.g. Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985;
Domencich and McFadden, 1975, and behavioural response, e.g.
Kahneman and Tverski, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
However, the contribution of this research to the understanding of
climate policy has so far been mostly overlooked in climate change
mitigation modelling or environmental assessment research. Their
use thus remains a promising but emerging ﬁeld (e.g. Köhler et al.,
2009; Axsen et al., 2009; Giraudet et al., 2012; Rivers and Jaccard,
2006). Grubb (2014) emphasises the need for future research on
behavioural aspects of emissions reductions. Insufﬁcient efforts
have been devoted to understanding the aggregate behavioural
response to sustainability policy instruments, and this is related to
a possibly overstated expectation that an efﬁcient equilibrium
should emerge on its own in technology markets.
Empirical marketing research literature shows that technology
substitution in many different contexts follows simple S-shaped
diffusion proﬁles (e.g. Fisher and Pry, 1971; Grübler et al., 1999;
Mansﬁeld,1961; Marchetti and Nakicenovic,1978). More generally,
the competition between several technologies for market space
can be described by coupled Lotka-Volterra systems (Bhargava,
1989; Karmeshu et al., 1985). More recently, it has been shown that
Lotka-Volterra systems can be derived from simple statistics of
industrial dynamics (Mercure, 2015). This can equivalently be
expressed with the ‘replicator dynamics’ system of evolutionary
theory: natural selection is carried out by the consumer, who ﬁlters
successful innovations based on their ﬁtness to the market, while
entrepreneurs strive to improve their products in order to increase
their ﬁtness by better matching consumer taste (e.g. Safarzynska and
van den Bergh, 2010). This natural selection, however, involves
decision-making by consumers under bounded rationality, who
are naturally highly diverse, and the diversity of consumers drives
product differentiation and increasing product diversity (for
example with private vehicles, see section 3.1. below).
Equilibrium/optimisation models neglect agent heterogeneity
and interactions, as they look at average agents in isolation facing
choices (with perfect information), rather than at socio-technical
systems where agents inﬂuence what other agents do. Agent
heterogeneity could, however, be represented to some extent in
models by introducing statistical distributions over agent per-
spectives (see Figs. 1 and 3: preferences are often simply
distributed), instead of using mean values only. In such a
framework, the modeller disposes of both mean values as well
as ranges. Then, when evaluating aggregate agent propensities
towards technology substitution, one simply faces comparisons
between probability distributions, as for instance in a binary logit.
Chains of binary logits enable to deﬁne agents with bounded
rationality and to model diffusion dynamics, not typically done in
current models (Mercure, 2015).
This is an area where our methodological shift may advance the
understanding of sustainability policy by moving the research
focus from the generation of ‘desirable’ energy sector storylines
(policy formulation) to the forecasting of ‘likely’ policy outcomes
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of a binary logit, reproduced from (Mercure, 2015). Agent perceptions of the generalised cost (i.e. including non-pecuniary terms) of choice
options vary around central values. In a choice between two options with distributed costs, neither is adopted by all agents; each gets a fraction of agent choices according to a
comparison between perceived cost distributions, and the rate of adoption depends strongly on the diversity of agent perceptions.
106 J.-F. Mercure et al. / Global Environmental Change 37 (2016) 102–115
(policy assessment) based on existing technology, knowledge of
the market, and technology diffusion dynamics. More fundamen-
tally, the proposed methodology disentangles normative and
descriptive analysis as useful but distinct perspectives (see
Mercure et al., 2014 for an extensive discussion). However, as is
the case with any model involving non-linear dynamics, uncer-
tainty over model outcomes due to uncertainty over parameters
increases exponentially with modelling time span, an issue that
needs to be addressed (see section 2.3 below).
2.2. Green growth: macroeconomics and the ﬁnance of innovations
Complexity and agent heterogeneity are also important to
understand the interactions between technology diffusion, lend-
ers’ expectations and macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, which drive
economic development/growth and are affected by climate change
mitigation policies. Theories based on utility-maximising non-
interacting agents assume full employment of economic resources.
Under full employment, policies that lead to a re-allocation of
resources from an optimal equilibrium starting-point are unavoid-
ably detrimental to economic performance. However, full employ-
ment is never observed in reality. In real life, expectations as to the
performance and return of innovations drive most investment, and
ultimately, economic development and growth. Importantly,
expectations as a process arise from multi-agent interactions
(e.g. see the artiﬁcial stock market by Arthur et al., 1997).
Policies for the diffusion of low-carbon innovations present
signiﬁcant opportunities for both the private sector and job
creation (e.g. Blyth et al., 2014; CBI, 2014). But the feedback
between the diffusion of new sustainability technologies and
economic development/growth is poorly understood and reported.
There is an apparent contradiction between observations of highly
lucrative activity arising in successful low-carbon ventures (e.g.
Tesla electric and Toyota hybrid cars, wind turbines, solar
photovoltaic), and the perception that the use of lowest-cost
fossil energy with conventional technology is indispensable for
development/growth. This type of dichotomy pervades climate
policy-making.
In conventional equilibrium economics, full employment
(which results from maximising the utility of the representative
agent) entails that all resources are currently allocated in the
economy in the most productive way they can be. This is
contradicted by empirical observation (e.g. as reviewed by Grubb,
2014), which shows that different countries lie at varying distances
from theoretically deﬁned efﬁciency or productivity frontiers.
Effectively, the use of economic resources depends upon the
economic development trajectory followed by an economy
(investment, ﬁxed and human capital and labour, ibid). Moreover,
in equilibrium-based theories, savings are understood as a share of
ﬁxed national income (GDP), equal to investment, resulting from a
choice by agents between spending on consumption in the present
or in the future. Thus if a ﬁxed share of income is allocated to
investment, naturally, all ﬁrms compete for this ﬁxed allowance
(crowding-out), equilibrating supply and demand for ﬁnance.
Since in equilibrium investment and labour is ﬁxed, equilibrium-
based theories cannot reproduce ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations or crises,
such as those observed since 2007, or involuntary unemployment,
as currently observed in many parts of Europe (Eurostat, 2015).
In a broader complexity/non-equilibrium economics perspec-
tive, income is not ﬁxed, and thus investment does not need to be a
constant share of the ‘welfare of the representative agent’. Instead,
causality is reversed: income heavily depends upon investment,
and investment decisions depend upon decisions by ﬁnancial
institutions. This link, however, opens the door to ﬂuctuations:
interacting investors in technology ventures can inﬂuence each
other into frenzies or panics. Indeed, the ﬁnance of technology and
innovation leads to productivity change (a phenomenon demon-
strated already in the 1950s by Solow, 1957) but also to speculation
and bubbles (Keynes, 1936), which, in turn, create economic cycles
(see Perez, 2001; Freeman and Louça, 2001; Schumpeter, 1934,
1939). Investment ﬂuctuations heavily inﬂuence the level of
economic development. This dynamic was at the roots of the great
recession (Keen, 2011), after which quantitative easing was used to
offset the reluctance of ﬁnancial institutions to provide credit. This
dynamic cannot be understood without taking into account the
interactions between technology diffusion, lender expectations
and macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
More realistic economic modelling that allows for variable
amounts of ﬁnance and investment is possible if one abandons the
restrictive assumptions of equilibrium approaches (imposing a
theory of non-interacting agents that are all simultaneously
employed or not employed) with their assumed full employment
of economic resources. In a theoretical approach that allows for
crowd effects to emerge, the amount of investment in the economy
is determined by investment decisions by lenders acting upon
expectations of return. This is not a new theoretical approach. In
point of fact, it is at the roots of both Schumpeterian (Schumpeter,
1934, 1939) and Keynesian (Keynes, 1936) forms of demand-led
economics. A post-Schumpeterian or post-Keynesian perspective
also allows for ﬂuctuating amounts of money in the economy, and
indeed, this is what is observed (called endogenous money, as
explained by the Bank of England, see McLeay et al., 2014).
As understood in the tradition of Schumpeterian economic
history, the emergence of new technologies is characterised by
important increasing returns to investment and adoption, and it
involves strongly path-dependent cross-sectoral spill-overs that
often lead to economy-wide activity accelerators (Freeman and
Louça, 2001). For example, in the industrial revolution, new textile
machinery required better iron and steel. Investment in iron and
steel led to the emergence of an industry as well as cost reductions
that reshaped the whole ‘design space’ for other products to be
made out of those materials more cheaply (ibid). This, in turn,
enabled many related and clustered innovations to emerge and
economically reach the marketplace (a statistical analysis of the
process of clustering of innovations is given by Arthur and Polak,
2006). In the Schumpeterian economic tradition, the clustering of
investment stemming from the clustering of innovation leads to
both economic prosperity and depression periods in alternation
(Freeman and Louça, 2001; Perez, 2001; Schumpeter, 1939). Risks
of ﬁnancial crises arise when ﬁnance is raised using ﬁnancial assets
as collateral (Keen, 1995, 2011), a phenomenon known to have
taken place periodically over history (Perez, 2001), including in
recent years (Keen, 2011).
Formal modelling of path-dependent, non-equilibrium macro-
economics is possible on the basis of two assumptions. Firstly,
under the principle of cumulative causation of knowledge accumu-
lation, productivity change is described by sets of aggregate
sectoral learning curves where productivity growth is derived from
cumulative investment and is roughly consistent with the trends
observed in economic history, e.g. in Kaldor (1957),Schumpeter
(1934). Secondly, income must be allowed to depend upon
investment, instead of the reverse. This understanding is path-
dependent and implicitly integrates multi-agent interactions by
allowing increasing returns: learning (i.e. knowledge accumula-
tion), investment ﬂuctuations (through expectations), economic
cycles and technology diffusion (through social interactions). One
example of such a model is E3ME/G (see www.e3me.com,
Cambridge Econometrics, 2014a), which derives a closed set of
functional relationships using regressions on economic data, and
thus enables the evaluation of employment, instead of remaining
constrained by the full employment assumption. Other similar
models exist, including GINFORS (Meyer et al., 2013). However, so
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far, no large-scale model has included detailed dynamics of the
ﬁnancial sector (Pollitt and Mercure 2015).
With regard to climate change mitigation, it is well established
that an amount of investment in the energy sector larger than in a
business-as-usual scenario will be necessary (e.g. IEA, 2012). This
scale of investment in new technology sectors is likely to result in
substantial economic reallocations due to cross-sectoral spill-
overs (e.g. new materials, new design and engineering methods,
etc). Importantly, in models without the constraint of full-
employment of resources, capital and labour, the impact can be
either beneﬁcial or detrimental, depending on many factors, such
as the trade balance, energy imports, international competition
and relative prices. When the implications are beneﬁcial, the
transition can be termed as green growth, where new investment
and employment are generated from technology policy, although
possibly with important relative price changes. In section 3.2, we
discuss an example where climate change mitigation policy leads
to increased employment and GDP as a result of enhanced
investment in the electricity sector. This said, technology policy
does not necessarily lead to beneﬁcial impacts because such
policies can take many forms. In an equilibrium-based theory,
however, the possibility of beneﬁcial outcomes is entirely ruled
out, and by assumption rather than as a result of calculations.
Indeed, equilibrium models always predict detrimental impacts for
climate mitigation efforts (e.g. as in all the models chosen in the
5th assessment report of the IPCC, see IPCC, 2014, Ch. 6, p.450),
such that the debate is framed in terms of burden, and economic
opportunities of climate policies are not extensively examined
(Grubb, 2014; see, however, Ekins et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2015). This
is also the case of partial equilibrium models, where, such as in the
case of the World Energy Model utilized by the International
Energy Agency for its World Energy Outlook report, the investment
cost of interventions is estimated, but it is not compared to policy-
induced avoided costs nor the impact of these interventions on the
macroeconomy. The result is a partial analysis that emphasizes
only the costs, and not the beneﬁts of intervention (UNEP, 2011).
Thus, and importantly, we see that the incorporation of multi-
agent interactions (by accounting for feedback loops, delays and
nonlinearity) leads to key consequences for theory and its
application: in a theory where investment is determined by
expectations, information ﬂow between variables runs from
variable or ﬂuctuating savings/investment to income, back to
investment, and allows for beneﬁcial impacts of technology policy
while in equilibrium-based theories, information ﬂows from ﬁxed
income to investment, and beneﬁcial impacts are ruled out. Given
the scale of the socio-economic transformation required to address
climate change, a realistic understanding of whether a
sustainability transition involving mitigation policies favours or
hinders economic development/growth is key for sound policy-
making.
2.3. Uncertainty analysis in human-environment interactions and
climate change
Models based on complexity theory can better describe the
complex interactions between the socio-economic and the natural
(environment) systems. Such interactions are at the heart of
climate policy, and they can be effectively simulated at a low cost
through the use of statistical emulators.
Feedbacks between the economy and the natural environment
take place through direct human intervention (e.g. land-use
change) or indirectly through the impact of economic activity (e.g.
the generation of air pollution or the emission of greenhouse gases
causing climate change). The natural environment inﬂuences, in
turn, human action leading to a highly complex system of
feedbacks. The allocation of land for agriculture, including crops
for biofuels, interacts directly with the climatic system through
phenomena such as deforestation, land-use change emissions and
desertiﬁcation, but also indirectly through the economy. The
extensive use of water further constrains the availability of natural
resources for human use, in what is increasingly referred to as the
food-energy-water nexus. At the same time, natural resource use
stems directly from economic processes, involving the demand for
agricultural, energy and forestry commodities that are traded in
international markets.
Exploring complex interactions between the environment and
the socio-economic system requires detailed representations of
the role and behaviour of the natural environment, which is no
minor endeavour. Indeed, climate modelling is carried out with the
most powerful supercomputers currently available. The response
of the environment to anthropogenic inﬂuence is increasingly well
understood (IPCC, 2013) and some of this knowledge has been
reproduced reliably enough through the use of emulators
(statistical representations). Emulators can be used directly,
without requiring detailed parallel simulations with supercom-
puters alongside an economic model. Such statistical representa-
tions, which interpolate climate responses based on large climate
model output data, have now been used for some time (e.g.
Meinshausen et al., 2009), facilitating the access by social and
economic modellers to quantitative results from climate science,
usually carried out in different institutions.
In this context, a frequently used tool is the linear approach of
‘pattern scaling’ (Tebaldi and Arblaster, 2014). This approach
assumes that the spatial pattern of change in the climate output of
Fig. 2. Schematic representation of cascading uncertainty across statistical model emulators.
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interest is invariant with respect to time and forcing. This
approximation is often inadequate, however, for instance in the
case of land-use change, which not only has signiﬁcant impacts on
the global climate through greenhouse gas emissions but also has a
more localised (i.e. ‘pattern changing’) impact on climate through
changes in surface albedo, moisture transfer and river runoff
(Myhre et al., 2013). A more general approach that allows for
changes in the pattern of climate impacts has been developed
recently (Holden and Edwards, 2010) and applied to ‘emulate’
complex models of a range of climatic systems. The technique has
been used to produce emulators for the climate model PLASIM-
ENTS (Holden et al., 2014), the carbon cycle model GENIE (Holden
et al., 2013), and the land surface model LPJmL (Oyebamiji et al.,
2015). These emulators have already been applied in a range of
integrated assessments (including but not limited to IEA, 2013;
Labriet et al., 2013; Mercure et al., 2014).
Such a methodology provides a useful platform for the
integration of large amounts of environmental data into socio-
economic and policy analyses. By concatenating such emulators in
‘chains’ (see schema in Fig. 2), one can indeed obtain a
representation of uncertainty cascading across sectors. This
technique avoids possible biases that may emerge from the use
of median trajectories when linking different models. And it
enables the exploration of representations of all likely trajectories
simultaneously, at low computational costs.
The cascading of uncertainty that increases with simulation
timespan stems from the general property of complex non-linear
models, which produce scenarios that diverge from each other
exponentially for arbitrarily small changes in starting parameters
(i.e. the sometimes termed ‘butterﬂy effect’ in chaos theory),
typical of climate models. This type of uncertainty is also a
property of an economic model with positive feedbacks, as well as
of diffusion-based technology models. More generally, it would be
inconsistent to treat economic projections as deterministic (e.g. a
GDP trajectory in equilibrium), while treating climate projections
as probabilistic (e.g. 95% probability range for a global warming
trajectory). It is, however, entirely possible to assign ‘uncertainty
bounds’ to projections of a socio-economic model through the use
of statistical analysis. Thus, the uncertainty faced in climate policy-
making can be effectively tackled through such statistical short-
cuts. Depending on the sensitivity of each sub-system to
perturbations (i.e. the rate of divergence of scenarios, and
conversely, the possible presence of ‘attracting states’) the cloud
of uncertainty may increase moderately or dramatically as it
propagates through the chain. This in turn provides a clear
quantiﬁcation of our ability to reliably model the ensemble of
systems.
2.4. Policy effectiveness, behaviour and implementation
Tools from marketing research, anthropology and behavioural
economics can be very useful to improve our understanding of
consumer and investor behaviour. They provide a powerful
addition to economy-environment modelling, namely the ability
to predict quantitatively the most likely aggregate response to
policy instruments. Valuable insights can be gained in this way. In
climate change policy, which requires action sooner rather than
later, there is signiﬁcant value in the ability to predict the
effectiveness of emissions reduction measures. However, assessing
such feasibility requires knowledge of their legal and political
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implications and constraints (e.g. political feasibility, legal
consistency), which may be just as important. Apparently minor
differences in the applicable legal framework (e.g. the modalities
for the acquisition of land, the modalities for the initial distribution
of emission reductions or for their banking, the local content
requirements added to a feed-in-tariff scheme to make them
politically palatable) may, in fact, make certain developments less
effective, or more vulnerable to challenge, or even block them
entirely.
Much policy analysis has been carried out in connection with
speciﬁc policies proposed to address externalities such as pollution
or environmental degradation, including taxes and other ﬁnancial
incentives imposed on households, ﬁrms or consumers. The
justiﬁcation for taxes is often based on considerations of ethics
and social justice (IPCC, 2014, Ch. 3); it less frequently results from
the analysis of their likely effectiveness (IPCC, 2014, Ch.15). Indeed,
policies are often chosen and adopted without much prior
knowledge of their likely effectiveness, which ultimately lies with
investor and consumer decisions. Their impact is mostly assessed
ex-post; however here, relying on ex-post policy evaluation does
not ﬁt in the timescale of action.
Policy analysis for climate change mitigation is complex, and
realistic proposals must take into account the political and
institutional (legal—both domestic and international) context.
For example, some environmental differentiation techniques (e.g.
certain subsidies or feed-in tariffs), may be inconsistent with
international economic law and can attract signiﬁcant legal
difﬁculties (Vinuales, 2012). Furthermore, the introduction of
carbon pricing mechanisms (e.g. a cap-and-trade system where the
allowances are freely allocated – at least initially – on the basis of
prior emissions) can be politically very different from that of
energy/fuel standards or emissions taxation, and it would
therefore have a different likelihood of success. Thus, studying
the effectiveness and feasibility of policy measures requires
integrating expertise on the mechanisms of policy-making and
law with expertise on the modelling of decision-making by
investors and consumers. However, such a broad integration of
expertise is extremely rare in contemporary state-of-the-art
climate change mitigation research.
We propose here, as part of the working structure of
simulation-based sustainability policy assessments, a two-way
feedback with knowledge of domestic/comparative politics and
environmental, investment and trade law. This would effectively
guide the ‘what if’ approach to scenario-creation for testing
potential policies, as opposed to proposing policies that are already
‘optimal’. Effectively, in a model that is not based on optimisation,
policies are assessed on the basis of their ability to effectively
achieve certain objectives through the simultaneous use of several
policy instruments that interact with one another. Such an
approach avoids the more common siloed assessments, and it
accounts for policy impacts across sectors. This approach is in fact
recommended by the European Commission in its Impact
Assessment guidelines (EC, 2009, 2015).
3. Practical relevance of the paradigm shift: speciﬁc
applications to four key climate policy issues
3.1. The impact of consumer heterogeneity on the diffusion of new
transport technology
The importance of agent heterogeneity for technology adoption
can be empirically established, as shown in Fig. 3, using private
passenger vehicle purchases as an example derived from recent
work (Mercure and Lam, 2015). As shown in Fig. 3, in the UK, the
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distribution of car purchase prices follows closely the income
distribution (panel a). Cars of different prices have different
manufacturer-rated emissions, which are thus similarly distribut-
ed (panel b). Vehicles with alternative engine technologies have
yet a different distribution, and this stems from their gradual
process of diffusion, which takes place unevenly with respect to
the distribution of conventional vehicles (panel c). Finally, rated
emissions are correlated with vehicle prices through a log-linear
relationship.
Car purchase choices largely depend upon each consumer's
respective social group, through social interactions, as has been
shown in empirical work (for example McShane et al., 2012). This
generally explains the relationship between consumption behav-
iour and income distribution shown above. Consumers do not
attempt to minimise their transportation costs; instead they
apparently purchase what is most common in their visible
surroundings, and the diversity of social groups is what forms
the lognormal distribution shown above. Alternatively, we can say
that consumers maximise utility within a subset of the market
(bounded rationality) deﬁned by their social interactions.
It thus appears necessary to look at each band of income, and
each type of consumer, separately. If we now explore possible
substitutions between models that could result from emissions
reduction policies in the car market, we can calculate elasticities of
substitution from these distributions by determining statistically
which vehicle models are most likely to be chosen within the same
new price band (after tax). Therefore, the rate of adoption of
consumer technology, including low carbon systems, stems
precisely from this diversity, which varies across the world (as
shown in Mercure and Lam, 2015). This enables us to determine the
effectiveness of certain low-carbon policies (taxes, subsidies) at
incentivising technology substitution, using market data. In point
of fact, this is exactly what marketing research does to forecast
sales before placing new products in the market.
Such information can be fed into technology diffusion models
that aim to reproduce typical S-shaped proﬁles (e.g. as in the
Future Technology Transformations (FTT) model, Mercure, 2012) to
provide expected rates of adoption (see Fig. 5 further below). Such
a representation reproduces technology lock-ins. This picture is
incomplete, however, as it does not represent attitudes and
culture. Yet, just as with ﬁrms attempting to place new products in
the market, the more detailed information thus gained helps to
better characterise the rates of technology adoption that could
result from proposed policies throughout the diffusion cycle. By
contrast, optimisation-based models would typically characterise
variations in consumer behaviour, at best, by parameterising
different discount rates for technologies attributed to particular
market segments.
3.2. Green growth: employment and income impacts of low-carbon
investments
The importance of accounting for the interactions between
lenders’ expectations, technology diffusion and macroeconomic
variables can be illustrated by reference to the link between low-
carbon investments, income and employment. Fig. 4 is based on a
non-equilibrium macroeconomic model, which is not subject to
the full employment constraint (E3ME/E3MG Cambridge Econo-
metrics, 2014b). It shows a possible causal chain in the process of
Fig. 5. Example calculation of the environmental impacts of electricity policy instruments using E3MG-FTT (left 4 panels) with emulators (right panels), from policy to global
warming, with cascading uncertainty bounds from combined carbon cycle and climate system emulators (Mercure et al., 2015).
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technology ﬁnance based on expectations impacting the economy
in the electricity sector. This calculation is further described in
Mercure et al. (2015).
In this model, no limit is imposed on ﬁnance for technology
developments, which in contrast to an equilibrium model, has no
direct relationship to interest rates (assumed in equilibrium to
clear the money market). In other words, ﬁnancial resources are
given to entrepreneurs by banks for low-carbon investments
through credit creation. The model’s critical assumption is only the
solvency of entrepreneurial activity, i.e. economic viability of low-
carbon projects. Therefore it is not claimed that the economic
system has no limit at all on money ﬂows: it is assumed that all
technology ventures that are ﬁnanced in any scenario are
proﬁtable (for instance by assuming sustained credible policy
and/or prices that make these ventures feasible), and that
government and/or private debt is not indeﬁnitely increased. This
ensures that situations that could lead to ﬁnancial instability
through unsustainable debt growth are not created. This example
is selected to show that economic outcomes of mitigation policy in
models are entirely dependent on model architecture, and that
impacts can be (but are not necessarily) beneﬁcial if one allows for
non-equilibrium effects.
In this example, the electricity sector is decarbonised by 90%
(scenario previously published in Mercure et al., 2014). Higher
costs of low-carbon electricity generation technologies (e.g. wind
turbines, solar panels, carbon capture and storage) are passed on
by utilities into their bills to customers, i.e. into higher prices of
electricity, proportionally to the evolving technology composition.
Entrepreneurial activity requires loans to ﬁnance new low-carbon
capital, which requires more investment than existing fossil fuel
generators. Banks create money to ﬁnance these ventures. Loans are
paid back over capital lifetime by ﬁrms using a higher price of
electricity (and, for example, possible feed-in tariffs), and the
additional money is gradually destroyed as the loans are paid back. In
the model, as shown in Fig. 4, the higher level of money ﬂows from
investment (panel a) creates jobs (panel e), increases disposable
income (panel f) and consumption (panel g), with possible effects
on inﬂation (panel h). Meanwhile, higher prices of electricity
increase operational costs of most sectors, and thus decrease
employment, household income and consumption (same panels),
i.e. an offsetting force. These two effects were observed to roughly
cancel each other in the model and scenario (see Mercure et al.,
2015). A positive ‘green growth effect’, in this particular case, is
generated in parts due to redistribution policy, in parts due to
increased employment. Revenue raised by fuel taxes (panel c)
aimed at incentivising technological change (carbon pricing),
minus spending on technology subsidies (panel b), is indeed
recycled to lower income tax. This moves the system’s balance
towards a higher income level than in a baseline scenario (higher
GDP, panel i). This effect subsides in later years (US, Europe) when
investment and redistribution declines, while the price of
electricity remains high, and the effect may even reverse when
the technology transformation is completed and society faces
servicing debt only. Debt servicing takes place through consumers
paying a higher price for electricity.
Note, therefore, that while economic growth is enhanced in this
scenario, private debt is also increased beyond the end of the
simulation. In non-equilibrium theory, borrowed investment ﬂows
indirectly contribute to increased aggregate demand in the short
run, when loans are issued, and to decreased demand in the long
run, when loans are gradually paid back. Increasing the level of
borrowing generates debt-based growth, which if done indeﬁnite-
ly, generates signiﬁcant prosperity but eventually leads to collapse
through a ﬁnancial crisis. It is unlikely that climate change
mitigation would lead to indeﬁnite borrowing. But it will likely
require signiﬁcant amounts of ﬁnance.
According to Keen (e.g. Keen, 2011), extended debt-based
growth and excessive debt levels have been the underlying cause of
the recent banking crisis, and possibly many other economic cycles
historically (Perez, 2001). This points to a complex entanglement
between strategies for economic recovery after the economic
crisis, and strategies for climate change mitigation policy. The
ﬁnancial crisis involved banks refusing to lend despite quantitative
easing, while mitigation, a potential economic stimulant, requires
increased amounts of ﬁnance in the energy sector.
We conclude that further research is required to understand the
levels of debt and risk, private and public, that economies can
realistically undertake to reduce global emissions, as well as to
clarify the collective expectations on their economic returns. In a
complexity/non-equilibrium perspective, the impact of collective
expectations appears to be the key issue to explain, rather than
simple welfare effects of different allocations of ﬁxed amounts of
capital typically analysed with current optimisation models. In the
context of scenarios of rapid decarbonisation, the analysis of debt
and access to ﬁnance becomes particularly crucial.
3.3. Model integration across processes with cascading uncertainty
Large models of the natural world have many imperfectly
known parameters as well as – through multiple combinations of
those parameters – a considerable number of possible output
values arising from variations in those parameters (even 10 settings
of only 10 parameters would generate 1010 possibilities). Statistical
modelling techniques are required to interpret such a large space
of uncertain outcomes. When several models are ‘soft-linked’ in a
causal chain, the uncertainty of models upstream inevitably
generates higher uncertainty downstream as we give ever wider
ranges of parameters to models. Fig. 5 gives an example of this with
3 soft-linked models, starting with individual emissions scenarios
from E3MG-FTT (note that these scenarios are the same as in Fig. 4,
their emissions trajectories coupled to climate emulators; they are
also the same as scenarios a. and j. in Mercure et al., 2014).
In (a.), we have a baseline scenario of the composition of the
global electricity sector, calculated under 21 regions independent-
ly. Using a composite scenario of emissions reduction policies that
include carbon pricing, technology support policies (subsidies and
feed-in tariffs) and regulations (available in Mercure et al., 2014),
the electricity sector is transformed towards low-carbon technol-
ogies (b.). Baseline emissions are projected to increase by 318%
based on their 1990 level (c.), while in the decarbonisation
scenario, they are reduced by 90% (d.).
These emissions scenarios are fed to the carbon cycle emulator
GENIEem, which generates GHG concentration outputs with 95%
probability ranges (e.). These are then fed to the emulator of the
climate model PLASIM-ENTS, producing a set of scenarios for
global warming (f.), as well as other locally resolved changes of
climate (on a 0.5 grid, not shown). The soft-linking thus produces
double uncertainty ranges from the concatenation of uncertainty.
We ﬁnd that decarbonising the electricity sector by 90% is not
sufﬁcient to avoid exceeding 50% chance of exceeding the
international target of 2 C (Mercure et al., 2014). All sectors of
the energy end-use system must be involved, notably transport.
Cascading uncertainty ranges in this context is as important as
cascading median trajectories.
3.3.1. Cross-sectoral impacts of biofuels policy
In an optimisation model of land allocation, best allocations of
farming activities are determined across the surface of the land
studied, which extends to the whole world for global models. This
implies that farmers know instantaneously what is too little and
too much, and never generate excess product. Without excess
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product or shortages, price ﬂuctuations cannot occur. This is, of
course, not what is observed (Piesse and Thirtle, 2009). However,
building a model that can reproduce observed price ﬂuctuations is
a signiﬁcant challenge, even though such ﬂuctuations seem crucial
to understand environmental degradation and biodiversity loss.
Indeed, some deforestation occurs not directly because of an
increasing consumption of agricultural commodities globally, but
as a result of commodity prices ﬂuctuating globally, due to self-
reinforcing expectations of returns (e.g. Arima et al., 2011; Morton
et al., 2006).
In a non-equilibrium model that includes representations of
decision-making by heterogeneous agents in agriculture with
expectations of return on their crops, in tandem with a global
model of the economy and bilateral trade of agricultural
commodities, very different dynamics can emerge. The use of
heterogeneous agent functional types has been suggested to
improve model realism (Arneth et al., 2014; Rounsevell et al.,
2014). While price substitutions and changes in trade patterns can
occur with the consumption of agricultural commodities, massive
land clearance and conversions can also take place to accommo-
date expectations around changing prices. Such models generate
highly complex dynamics, but are useful to determine what types
of transformations could occur in the future without appropriate
land management policy. Complex dynamics however will only
arise in models that incorporate heterogeneity, increasing returns
and expectations. When land-use decisions are based on expect-
ations and inﬂuenced by neighbourhood effects, then similar
contagion dynamics as in technology diffusion may take place, i.e.
the diffusion of agricultural practices.
When brought into the picture, biofuels policy adds further
uncertainty and complexity. On the one hand, the willingness to
pay for ethanol in some parts of the world could outbid the ability
to pay for food commodities in other parts of the world, while, on
the other hand, shortages of food may also be felt through
commodity prices after land-use decisions are already made and
applied. Effectively, some biofuels policies have the potential to
open the door for substantial ﬂuctuations in food prices, but we do
not know which ones, and at what scale. This issue requires models
of a type that is currently not available, but needs to be addressed
rapidly.
3.4. Is higher model complexity an advantage or a drawback for policy-
makers?
Lower complexity or reduced-form models are often argued to
be advantageous to use due to their higher apparent transparency,
and thus more appropriate for policy-making. An example is the
use of Nordhaus' DICE model, which was originally designed for
illustrative purposes using sketchy data, but has been used for
policy-making purposes in some countries, including the USA and
the UK.
Lower complexity does not mean better science, and simpliﬁ-
cations can, in some cases (e.g. as with Nordhaus, 2010) lead to
potentially plainly incorrect conclusions (its single sector/good
representation of the economy excludes many important effects
such as spill-overs and multipliers). Moreover, and more funda-
mentally, the use of deterministic model projections (e.g. policy-
making based on an optimal carbon price that results from
intersecting deterministic curves for the social cost of carbon and
the marginal abatement cost) is not a scientiﬁcally correct
methodology. It is clearly inconsistent with the way complexity-
based climate modelling is conducted. No one would realistically
claim the ability to predict the exact mean global warming in 2050,
and there is no reason why such claims would be justiﬁed in
economics.
We thus argue that while higher complexity models may be
more difﬁcult to use in policy circles, such difﬁculty is clearly offset
by their greater realism and rigour. The key consideration is not
whether simpler or more complex models should be used, but
whether the science-policy interface is capable of relaying the
results of more powerful and realistic models to policy circles.
4. Conclusion: a world of new possibilities for sustainability
policy-making
Equilibrium and optimisation-based models are appropriate to
use for normative exploration and identiﬁcation of desirable future
conﬁgurations of the technology-economy-environment system.
Given the fact that they are comparatively highly detailed and
tested, they are currently treated as the standard approach. This is
possible because normative analysis relies entirely on assumptions
and does not require empirical knowledge of actual human
behaviour. However, such models support only certain steps of
the policy cycle, as they provide ambiguous information regarding
how to achieve – through policy interventions – the ideal
conﬁgurations they portray or how likely they may be. This gap
is a direct consequence of a lack of causal relationships with human
behaviour. Producing scenarios that accurately forecast the future
course of events as a result of policy choices, with any likelihood
(however low), requires ﬁne-grained representations of human
behaviour, its diversity and multi-agent interactions. These
representations are as necessarily imperfect as they are necessary
to come close to real life.
It is often argued that forecasting is not possible, and that
serious sustainability science can only express itself in the form of
exploratory scenarios (e.g. van Vuuren et al., 2011). We submit in
contrast that forecasting is both necessary and inevitable, and can
be improved within the bounds of ﬁnite predictability with
increased attention to known nonlinearities and interaction effects
(Tetlock and Gardner, 2015). The climate sciences provide a major
example of an area where outcomes are expressed in terms of
likelihood levels based on model statistics. Forecasts are not
always accurate, but they are nevertheless useful due to their
careful quantiﬁcation of probabilities, parameters and their
uncertainty. There is no inherent reason why this is not possible
in the social sciences. We note that the climate community now
prefers the term ‘projection' to indicate that model simulations are
predictions that are conditional on their inputs. This distinction of
terminology, while relevant to the remaining exogenous assump-
tions in our case, does not affect our fundamental conclusion.
The main challenge lies in the quantiﬁcation of likelihood,
which is not possible with current mainstream socio-economic
models. We do not claim, however, to be able to predict the onset of
wars, election results, natural disasters, strategic political choices
or other unique events. Thus, an important caveat must be made, in
that our methodological approach excludes the occurrence of some
events (just like in weather forecasts, which do not take into
account possibilities of volcanic eruptions, even in active areas).
Yet, the modelling paradigm shift proposed here opens a large
spectrum of possibilities for sustainability policy-making. It allows
for the quantiﬁcation  within uncertainty bounds  of the
expected effectiveness of speciﬁc policies aimed at inducing
particular agent groups to take particular decisions (e.g. consumer
purchases, investment choices, land-use decisions). The ability to
conduct such forecasts entails signiﬁcant advantages, including the
reduction of the uncertainty involved in creating policy portfolios,
and the possibility to explore their impacts across sectors through
the coupling of several sectoral models. For example, one could
study the impact of technology support policy for electric vehicles
on electricity prices, which would depend on the pace of their
adoption, or the impact on food prices of large scale land
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regulations to protect biodiversity or, still, the impact on
deforestation of biofuels policy in transport. These questions
present major analytical challenges, but their understanding
cannot wait any longer. We believe that the new generation of
non-equilibrium models proposed in this article is capable of rising
to this challenge.
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